Much appreciate the great work you have always been doing!
The motivation of why Farallon (aka. the investment manager of CHONS and the concert GBPO) has been consistently selling seems to be a continuous puzzle. Looks to me all the info we have about "Farallon's debt fund not allowed to hold equity so they are selling for non-fundamental reasons" has been guesswork, which has been proved wrong several times (about why Farallon "stopped" selling. The latest TR-1 disclosure looks like Farallon's selling is "unstoppable".
Curious if you have any smoking guns in that regard.
Thanks for the comment Scot. I've no particular insight into Farallon / CHONs motivations in selling, although I would think if this is an old legacy position that was restructured (debt into equity) and held in the same funds, they would presumably need to exit it sooner rather than later, depends on the fund life though. I would also think they would sell down in orderly tranches over time to avoid crashing the price which is what they seem to be doing. In summary, very difficult to say what their strategy here is
This is really, really interesting stuff. Lately, been spending a lot of time in midstream Oil and Gas as I like the value proposition there amongst increased consolidation like you mentioned. PANR looks like a good R/R here.
What do you think about increasing allocation to an Oil/Gas ETF? I like the capital cycle dynamics at the moment, but I don't believe that the situation around ESG will get any worse – these companies are hated by the public and policymakers, and seem like the typical "sin stocks".
Thanks for reading, glad you found it interesting. Regarding ETFs, I find specific equity situations based on fundamental characteristics more interesting from a risk/reward perspective. Regarding the ESG situation, I think the twitter thread I cited from John Arnold summaries well the realistic outlook for O&G over the next 5-10 years.
I am replying to this post since I recently came across Berkshire’s 1983 letter to shareholders. In particular, I’d like to comment the following two paragraphs:
“ For years the traditional wisdom – long on tradition, short on wisdom – held that inflation protection was best provided by businesses laden with natural resources, plants and machinery, or other tangible assets ("In Goods We Trust"). It doesn’t work that way. Asset-heavy businesses generally earn low rates of return – rates that often barely provide enough capital to fund the inflationary needs of the existing business, with nothing left over for real growth, for distribution to owners, or for acquisition of new businesses.
In contrast, a disproportionate number of the great business fortunes built up during the inflationary years arose from ownership of operations that combined intangibles of lasting value with relatively minor requirements for tangible assets. In such cases earnings have bounded upward in nominal dollars, and these dollars have been largely available for the acquisition of additional businesses. This phenomenon has been particularly evident in the communications business. That business has required little in the way of tangible investment – yet its franchises have endured. During inflation, Goodwill is the gift that keeps giving.”
How does this statement fit with the thesis of buying asset-heavy businesses such as real estate/infrastructure in an inflationary environment and what do you think about it?
Firstly, I think a distinction needs to be made in that not all asset heavy businesses will do well in inflationary regimes. But I do think certain assets within areas such as real estate and infrastructure that benefit from both inflation-linked income streams and rising replacement cost and where the asset base does not require continued heavy maintenance capex will do well in an inflationary environment. - e.g, income producing real estate portfolios, and infrastructure assets with toll-like incomes.
The examples in the Buffett quote refer more to heavy industrial or manufacturing businesses with large maintenance capex needs, which is very different to the type of real estate and infrastructure asset plays I'm focused on .
Have you looked at pipeline details? I believe it is at risk of shutting down due to insufficient volume at some point, but have not done the work to detail that risk.
Much appreciate the great work you have always been doing!
The motivation of why Farallon (aka. the investment manager of CHONS and the concert GBPO) has been consistently selling seems to be a continuous puzzle. Looks to me all the info we have about "Farallon's debt fund not allowed to hold equity so they are selling for non-fundamental reasons" has been guesswork, which has been proved wrong several times (about why Farallon "stopped" selling. The latest TR-1 disclosure looks like Farallon's selling is "unstoppable".
Curious if you have any smoking guns in that regard.
Thanks.
Thanks for the comment Scot. I've no particular insight into Farallon / CHONs motivations in selling, although I would think if this is an old legacy position that was restructured (debt into equity) and held in the same funds, they would presumably need to exit it sooner rather than later, depends on the fund life though. I would also think they would sell down in orderly tranches over time to avoid crashing the price which is what they seem to be doing. In summary, very difficult to say what their strategy here is
This is really, really interesting stuff. Lately, been spending a lot of time in midstream Oil and Gas as I like the value proposition there amongst increased consolidation like you mentioned. PANR looks like a good R/R here.
What do you think about increasing allocation to an Oil/Gas ETF? I like the capital cycle dynamics at the moment, but I don't believe that the situation around ESG will get any worse – these companies are hated by the public and policymakers, and seem like the typical "sin stocks".
Thanks for reading, glad you found it interesting. Regarding ETFs, I find specific equity situations based on fundamental characteristics more interesting from a risk/reward perspective. Regarding the ESG situation, I think the twitter thread I cited from John Arnold summaries well the realistic outlook for O&G over the next 5-10 years.
The problem with etfs is you have exposure to the majors who have all but divested from oil and gas.
Great commentary and analysis. Thanks Conor. I'll take a look at PANR. ZPHR may also be worth taking a look at. Cheers
Thanks Andrew, glad you found it interesting.
Brilliant.
Thanks for reading and commenting Chris, glad you found it interesting.
Hi Conor,
Love your work!
I am replying to this post since I recently came across Berkshire’s 1983 letter to shareholders. In particular, I’d like to comment the following two paragraphs:
“ For years the traditional wisdom – long on tradition, short on wisdom – held that inflation protection was best provided by businesses laden with natural resources, plants and machinery, or other tangible assets ("In Goods We Trust"). It doesn’t work that way. Asset-heavy businesses generally earn low rates of return – rates that often barely provide enough capital to fund the inflationary needs of the existing business, with nothing left over for real growth, for distribution to owners, or for acquisition of new businesses.
In contrast, a disproportionate number of the great business fortunes built up during the inflationary years arose from ownership of operations that combined intangibles of lasting value with relatively minor requirements for tangible assets. In such cases earnings have bounded upward in nominal dollars, and these dollars have been largely available for the acquisition of additional businesses. This phenomenon has been particularly evident in the communications business. That business has required little in the way of tangible investment – yet its franchises have endured. During inflation, Goodwill is the gift that keeps giving.”
How does this statement fit with the thesis of buying asset-heavy businesses such as real estate/infrastructure in an inflationary environment and what do you think about it?
Hi Vittorio, thanks for reading and commenting.
Firstly, I think a distinction needs to be made in that not all asset heavy businesses will do well in inflationary regimes. But I do think certain assets within areas such as real estate and infrastructure that benefit from both inflation-linked income streams and rising replacement cost and where the asset base does not require continued heavy maintenance capex will do well in an inflationary environment. - e.g, income producing real estate portfolios, and infrastructure assets with toll-like incomes.
The examples in the Buffett quote refer more to heavy industrial or manufacturing businesses with large maintenance capex needs, which is very different to the type of real estate and infrastructure asset plays I'm focused on .
Hope this clarifies.
Have you looked at pipeline details? I believe it is at risk of shutting down due to insufficient volume at some point, but have not done the work to detail that risk.
amazing work ... thanks for sharing!